Thursday, May 24, 2007

Investment bank buyouts in private equity arena

Investment banks making their own decisions
Investment banks aren't just advising and arranging the financing for private-equity buyers anymore. Today, many of these banks are working on deals for themselves alone.

Investment bank buyouts multiply
Promise of big profits is trumping potential for conflicts and losses
By Alistair Barr, MarketWatch

Instead of just advising on and arranging financing for private-equity buyouts, investment banks are increasingly doing the deals for themselves. In just one of the latest notable examples, Goldman Sachs (GS) on Monday joined with TPG Capital in an agreement to buy Alltel Corp., the nation's fifth-largest wireless-phone service carrier, for $27.5 billion in what would be the largest leveraged buyout ever in the U.S. telecommunications industry.

At the same time, Merrill Lynch (MER) took another step into the private-equity business too, when it bought a minority stake in GSO Capital Partners, an $8 billion hedge fund firm that helps private-equity companies finance deals.

The moves give Goldman and Merrill the chance to make much more money. But they also expose them to potential client conflicts and investment losses.

"The history of private equity at brokerage firms has been an on-again, off-again love affair," said Brad Hintz, an analyst at Bernstein Research and a former chief financial officer at Lehman Brothers.

During the 1980s boom in leveraged buyouts, major investment banks piled into acquisitions of their own, only to step back in the 1990s as they found themselves in conflict with their clients. It was for that reason, Hintz said, that Merrill dropped out of the business.

After the technology market blew up in 2001, brokerage firms saw a sharp retreat in earnings because they'd made private equity investments in tech companies. But since then, low interest rates and rising cash on corporate balance sheets has sparked an unprecedented private-equity boom that's made it difficult for investment banks to merely watch from the sidelines.

Top advisory candidateOne of the most alluring aspects of the business for firms like Goldman is that an in-house private-equity unit promises to boost investment banking revenue down the road. By taking an equity position, the bank instantly becomes the company's top candidate to become its adviser on any future underwriting or merger-advisory work in the future -- even though a competing brokerage might charge lower fees.

By Hintz's estimate, an investment bank gets a return of 40 cents in banking fees for every $1 it puts into a private-equity deal.

Here's how it works: Imagine you're chief executive of an industrial company that's just been acquired by Goldman Sachs's private-equity unit. They now own your company.
New regulations are also encouraging investment banks to put more of their own money into buyouts.

The upcoming Basel II accord requires less capital to be set aside to support private-equity investments. That is allowing banks like Goldman and Merrill to hold more private-equity investments on their balance sheets, Hintz explained.

The success of Goldman's private-equity unit also shows how profitable these businesses can be for Wall Street banks. The company has invested in more than 500 companies and more than $19 billion in capital has been committed to its buyout business since it began in 1983, according to Bernstein research.

In 2005, Goldman raised $8.5 billion for a private-equity fund, which at the time was the most money ever committed to a buyout fund. Several other private-equity firms have since topped that, but the fund remains among the 10 largest, according to Thomson Financial data.
Roughly one-quarter of the money came from Goldman and its employees.

Goldman's private-equity assets under management probably stood at roughly $19 billion at the end of 2005 and the bank generated management fees of about $220 million to $225 million that year, according to a Bernstein report in May 2006.

'Override' feeWith its buyout funds, Goldman tries to generate an internal rate of return of between 25% and 35%. In addition to investment returns and management fees, Goldman also collects an "override" fee, which is 20% of net gains when returns for the funds' outside investors rise above about 8% a year, Hintz said.

If Goldman manages to collect this 20% fee, further gains are shared, with 80% going to outside investors and 20% to Goldman, the analyst added.

"It's a high-return business," Hintz said. "Some are gold mines. Goldman is the expert at coining money from these businesses."

Other private-equity fees are charged too. Companies owned by private-equity firms usually pay a management fee of around 0.5% of annual revenue. Then there are advisory fees from the acquisition, bank syndication fees when companies' loans are refinanced, and sale or merger fees when the buyout firm unwinds its investment, Hintz said.

In 2005, Goldman's private-equity business probably had a pretax profit margin of 50%, Bernstein estimates. That's higher than its overall profit margin, which stood at 33% in 2005. The unit accounted for 5.3% of the bank's revenue and 8.2% of profit in 2005.

Losses, conflictsBut buyouts can produce investment losses too. From 2000 to 2002, Goldman's private-equity investments fell by 65%, Bernstein said, although the research firm noted that this was partly because the bank exited some holdings.

When an investment bank builds a big private-equity business, its risks conflict\ with other major private-equity players.

Goldman missed out on being named one of the underwriters for the upcoming initial public offering of Blackstone Group, one of the largest private-equity firms in the world. Bernstein's Hintz said that's a good example of how investment banks can end up competing against potential clients when they develop their own large private-equity businesses. "Private-equity firms are major, major clients of Wall Street and many brokerage firms are reluctant to compete with clients," he said, while noting that "Goldman has certainly been able to walk that fine line."
As these deals proliferate, they also have aroused controversy because they increase the likelihood that the firm would become both an adviser a potential bidder for a company that is up for sale.

Merrill Lynch, which has the second-largest private equity portfolio of any U.S. investment bank behind Goldman, often forms partnerships with other buyout firms. That reduces the potential for competitive conflicts but also cuts the fees and ultimate profitability of its business, Hintz said.

Still, buyouts were a big contributor to Merrill's earnings in 2006. Bernstein estimates that the business contributed 5% to 6% of the firm's revenue and more than 15% of its profit last year

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private equity, leveraged buyout, leveraged finance, invesment banking,

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Chrysler Sale May Accelerate Dealership Closings

Chrysler Sale May Accelerate Dealership Closings

Detroit's Big Three automakers have too many dealers for the number of cars they sell. Many of those dealers are hurting financially, and struggling dealers aren't in Detroit's best interest.
Automakers are now trying to thin their dealer ranks. Chrysler, for example, has cut the number of dealers by about 10 percent in the last four years, to about 3,700, and says it will eliminate hundreds more.

The news that the private equity firm Cerberus Capital Management is slated to acquire Chrysler has prompted some industry watchers to predict that many more dealers will be put on the chopping block.

On a recent afternoon, Bill Tapscott, the impeccably dressed general manager of Lithia Chrysler in Renton, Wash., showed off his new vehicles, including the Aspen, a seven- passenger luxury SUV. He has been selling Chrysler cars and trucks for nearly three decades.

His dealership is what Chrysler calls an alpha dealer. It sells the full line of the company's products: Chrysler, Dodge and Jeep all under one roof . This spacious, modern dealership is the wave of the future for Chrysler dealers. The automaker wants its dealers to have larger geographic territories, a broader customer base, and less competition with others selling the same brand. The aim: More sales and higher profits.

"Chrysler wants its dealers to be profitable," says David Cole of the independent Center for Automotive Research. Profitable dealers spend more on advertising, they invest in new facilities, and they provide the kind of atmosphere people are looking for as they shop for new cars, he says.

In short, says Cole, "dealers are the public face of an automaker." Those that make hefty profits project the image of a vibrant car company, selling autos you want to buy. Since dealers actually purchase their inventory from Chrysler, the faster dealers reorder, the better it is for Chrysler's bottom line. But right now there are too many cars sitting unsold on dealer lots.

Earlier this year the company announced plans to eliminate about 10 to 15 percent of its dealers over the next year or two. Chrysler spokesman Jason Vines says that plan has been endorsed by Cerberus and by the Chrysler dealers. But he acknowledges that dealer support is tempered.
"Everyone is favor of this. But like the old saying, 'Everyone wants to go to heaven but no one wants to die.' "

In other words, the dealers are interested in having fewer dealers so long as they aren't the one getting axed.

Vines adds that, for now, there are no plans to go beyond the previously announced cuts. But he concedes that could change.

"If other opportunities come about and it makes sense, sure we will do that," Vines says.
Indeed, some industry watchers, including Cole, suggest that Chrysler needs to eliminate 1,000 more dealers as part of its long-term strategy. Cole says the buyouts will be expensive. "It's probably going to cost hundreds of millions, maybe even a billion dollars to get the kind of dealer body they have to have."

Dealers have franchise agreements with Chrysler – and if Chrysler wants to terminate those arrangements, it will have to buy the dealers out. That's what General Motors did when it eliminated the Oldsmobile nameplate. GM won't say what that buyout cost, but some estimates put that figure at more than $800,000 per dealer.

Full Article and blog

auto industry, private equity, LBO, leveraged buyout

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